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I. INTRODUCTION
It has been a fairly busy year for Commercial Law in Virginia
courts, but not in the legislature. This may not last; there are al-
ready legislative efforts underway to extend the coverage of Vir-
ginia's Uniform Commercial Code (the "Code") to electronic fund
transfers and personal property leasing. If those efforts are success-
ful, the General Assembly will soon have on its hands the consider-
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B.A., 1974, John Carroll University; J.D., 1977, University of Michigan. The author grate-
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able task of evaluating the first major overhaul of the Code in a
decade.'
By contrast, 1987 produced only one major, and constitutionally
defective, amendment to the Code concerning the obligations of
farmers who sell farm products that are subject to a security inter-
est.2 And of the relatively large number of cases that kept the
courts busy, most were fairly routine. Some of the most interesting
case law developments occurred in Virginia's circuit courts, the de-
cisions of which are now being published on a regular basis.
This article covers all important changes made to the Code dur-
ing the 1987 session of the General Assembly. It also covers all sig-
nificant Virginia Supreme Court cases dealing directly with the
Code, together with significant reported Virginia law cases from
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the various federal
district and bankruptcy courts sitting in Virginia, and the Virginia
circuit courts. Highly unsystematic attention is given to some de-
velopments that indirectly affect the Code. The cases reviewed
were for the most part decided between April, 1986 and April,
1987, although a few earlier circuit court cases that were not previ-
ously published are included.
The goals of this article are twofold: to give practitioners ready
access to recent commercial law developments and to encourage a
deeper understanding of the policies underlying, and the intrica-
cies of, the Code.
II. SALES
A. Scope of Article Two
Article Two of the Code, although denominated "Sales," applies
by its terms to "transactions in goods."3 Despite the use of the
broad word "transactions" it is reasonably clear that the Article
itself is generally limited, as its title suggests, to sales transactions.
(However, its provisions are increasingly being subsumed into the
1. The last was in 1977, when articles 8 and 9 were revised to take into account the devel-
opment of "uncertificated" securities. Virginia adopted the Code's 1977 Amendments in
1984, effective 1985. For a general discussion of those Amendments, see Herbert, Commer-
cial Law: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 19 U. RICH. L. REV. 717, 717-22 (1985).
2. See infra notes 183-217 and accompanying text.
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-102 (Add. Vol. 1965).
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common law of contracts. 4) Moreover, it is quite clear that, to be
subject to the provisions of Article Two, a transaction must have a
close relationship to a transfer of title in "goods", which are de-
fined as "all things. . . which are moveable at the time of identifi-
cation to the contract for sale other than the money in which the
price is to be paid, investment securities . . . and things in
action." 5
Much ink, if little blood, has been spilled over the exact scope of
Article Two. The question is not an insignificant one, because Arti-
cle Two in a number of respects modifies traditional contract law
and these modifications have not yet been fully accepted into the
common law. In any marginal or doubtful case, the party who
would benefit from the differences between Article Two and the
older common law rules obviously wishes to bring the contract
under the Article.
Two major flashpoints exist: (1) personal property leases; and (2)
"mixed" contracts for goods and services or goods and other prop-
erty. The former deals with the "sales" requirement; the latter
with the "goods" requirement. One Virginia circuit court case has
been decided on each issue. Those issues, and the cases, are ad-
dressed in order.
1. Leases
Personal property leases, especially long-term leases, are not en-
tirely distinct from sales. A lessee receives certain rights to prop-
erty; a purchaser receives more. The most significant distinction is
time: the purchaser acquires the property "forever," or more pre-
cisely, for as long as it exists; the lessee for a set period of time.
This distinction is not always clear-cut. A person who leases
property for its entire useful life receives practically the same
thing as a person who purchases the property. Of course, the lessee
cannot resell or destroy the property, but these limitations may
also be imposed on a purchaser who has acquired the property on
credit and has given the seller a security interest; this is known as
acquiring the property "on time." Leases and sales are thus not
4. 1 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, §§ 2-102:4 to 2-102:5, at 500-502 (3d ed.
1981); J. WnITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE, § 1-1 at 22-24 (2d ed. 1980).
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-105(1) (Add. Vol. 1965); The definition of a sale is "the passing of
title from the seller to the buyer for a price . . . ." Id. § 8.2-106(1).
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wholly separate species; they both lie along a continuum of prop-
erty rights. These rights range from the evanescent rights of a per-
son who briefly borrows a pencil to the virtually unlimited rights of
the person who owns that pencil free and clear of any claims or
liens, subject only to the obligation not to use the pencil to maim,
murder, or publish obscenity. Because of this relationship between
sales and leases, it has long been argued that long-term personal
property leases should be brought under the aegis of Article Two.'
The courts have to a limited degree applied at least some parts of
Article Two to some types of leases, by finding that the Article
applied either "directly" or "by analogy." Most courts have at-
tempted to distinguish between "true" leases and "financing"
leases. "Financing" leases are not really leases, but are in fact sales
and thus subject to Article Two.7 Some courts have gone further.
They have held that, although Article Two as a whole does not
apply to true leases, some of its provisions should be extended to
such leases by analogy.'
In a remarkable opinion, the Circuit Court of the City of Rich-
mond has adopted a form of the second approach of partial appli-
cation by analogy. Gentry v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc.' involved a
long-term truck lease between Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. ("Ryder")
and Allied Chemical Corporation ("Allied"). Gentry, an employee
of Allied, was injured when a "grab bar" he tried to use to exit the
truck broke off.10 Ryder defended on three grounds: (1) there were-
no express warranties regarding the trucks; (2) there were no appli-
cable implied warranties regarding the trucks; and (3) Gentry was
not in privity with Ryder."
Both parties agreed that the warranty and privity provisions of
Article Two'2 did not apply, noting Leake v. Meredith.3 Thus, the
issue was whether parallel common-law principles should be ap-
plied.14 More precisely, the question was whether pre-Code case
6. See, e.g., Note, Disengaging Sales Law from the Sale Construct: A Proposal to Extend
the Scope of Article 2 of the UCC, 96 HARV. L. REV. 470 (1982).
7. See, e.g., Lectro Management, Inc. v. Freeman, Everett & Co., 135 Vt. 213, 373 A.2d
544 (1977).
8. See, e.g., Hiskey v. City of Seattle, 44 Wash. App. 110, 720 P.2d 867 (1986).
9. 8 Va. Cir. 360 (Richmond 1987).
10. Id. at 360.
11. Id. at 361.
12. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.2-314, -318 (Add. Vol. 1965).
13. 221 Va. 14, 267 S.E.2d 93 (1980).
14. Gentry, 8 Va. Cir. at 361.
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law that prohibited suits of the type brought by Gentry would still
be followed by the Virginia Supreme Court.15
In the view of the Gentry court, it would not.16 The court stated:
Lessors of motor vehicles stand in a place similar to, and sometimes
the same as, sellers. They place the vehicle into the hands of a party
who has little or no ability to discover that the product is defective
or, more importantly, to protect himself from such defects. Third
parties are even further removed from any ability to detect and pro-
tect themselves from a defective vehicle. The parties best able to
detect and protect from such defects are the manufacturers and the
lessors of the product.17
For the reasons stated, Gentry created a common law implied war-
ranty made' by the lessor "to Allied and all who used [the truck]
that it was safe for use."18
While there is considerable logic to the Gentry decision, the case
reflects a willingness to expand the traditional boundaries of war-
ranty law to an extent that is unusual in Virginia. While it is cer-
tainly true that Leake v. Meredith9 did not explicitly rule out the
creation of a common-law lease warranty structure parallel to the
sales warranty structure of Article Two, there is likewise nothing in
the opinion that supports such a creation. It should also be noted
that Gentry does not explicitly limit its new warranty rules to
long-term leases. Indeed, the central point made in the case-the
lessee's relative inability to protect against injury-could apply
with greater force to a casual, short-term consumer lessee than to
an experienced, long-term commercial lessee.20 To this extent,
15. Id. The cases cited were General Bronze Corp. v. Kostopulos, 203 Va. 66, 122 S.E.2d
548 (1961); Harris v. Hampton Roads Tractor & Equip. Co., 202 Va. 958, 121 S.E.2d 471
(1961); and Colonna v. Rosedale Dairy Co., 166 Va. 314, 186 S.E. 94 (1936). All three cases
address the privity question.
16. This despite the contrary view of the Fourth Circuit in Ely v. Blevins, 706 F.2d 479
(4th Cir. 1983), a case distinguished by Gentry because it did not deal with personal prop-
erty leases. Gentry, 8 Va. Cir. at 361.
17. 8 Va. Cir. at 362.
18. Id. at 363.
19. 221 Va. 14, 267 S.E.2d 93 (1980).
20. This may be reinforced by a fact, noted but not directly discussed in Gentry, that
Ryder completely controlled the maintenance of the trucks. 8 Va. Cir. at 360. If the lessor's
liability is predicated on the fact that its control of maintenance limits or eliminates the
lessee's ability and incentive to protect against injury, then a short term lessee who has
essentially no control over maintenance should be more protected than a long-term lessee
who has at the very least a greater opportunity to detect problems and either correct them
1987]
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Gentry goes even beyond those cases that have applied Article
Two by analogy to long-term leases.
Gentry may thus prove a bit too forward for Virginia tastes.
Even so, it opens an important debate over the appropriate scope
of a lessor's liability. Whether in the General Assembly or the
courts, this debate should continue.
2. Mixed Contracts
Many contracts provide for the acquisition of both goods and
other property or goods and services. For example, a person who
buys the assets of a manufacturing business buys goods (machin-
ery, office equipment, motor vehicles), realty (land and building),
and intangibles (accounts receivable). Similarly, a person who has
a roof added to his or her home acquires goods (shingles) and ser-
vices (attachment of the shingles to the house). Should these con-
tracts be governed by the Article Two rules or the common-law
rules?
Most courts apply what is usually called the "predominant pur-
pose" test. Under this test, if the "goods" portion of the contract
predominates, Article Two applies. However, if the "other prop-
erty" or "services" portion predominates, the common law ap-
plies." A smaller number of courts apply an "allocation" test in
which the court treats the deal as creating two contracts: one for
sale of goods subject to Article Two; one for sale of other property
or services subject to common law.22 As is true with leases, this
relatively simple structure is made more complex by the willing-
ness of some courts, in some incompletely defined circumstances,
to develop common-law provisions, applicable to non-goods con-
tracts or to the non-goods portion of a mixed contract, that are
identical or at least parallel to those of Article Two.23
The Circuit Court of the City of Alexandria, in Steingaszner v.
Paramount Termite Control Co.,24 succinctly dealt with the
problems of Article Two eligibility and analogy. The plaintiff, Ste-
or force the lessor to correct them.
21. See, e.g., Field v. Golden Triangle Broadcasting, Inc., 451 Pa. 410, 305 A.2d 689
(1973).
22. See, e.g., Foster v. Colorado Radio Corp., 381 F.2d 222 (10th Cir. 1967).
23. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp. of Philadelphia, 439 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867
(1970).
24. 5 Va. Cir. 309 (Alexandria 1985).
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ingaszner, had obtained pest control services from Paramount Ter-
mite Control Co., Inc. ("Paramount"). In providing those services,
Paramount used chemicals it had obtained from Velsicol. Stein-
gaszner alleged injury and sued Paramount and Velsicol on a num-
ber of grounds, including breach of warranty.25 Paramount de-
murred and Velsicol moved to dismiss or strike the pleadings.26
In rejecting the demurrer and the motion, the court made three
determinations. The first, which is not controversial, was that the
predominant purpose test would be used to determine the applica-
bility of Article Two. Since the contract was primarily for the
provision of pest control services, Article Two did not apply.2s
The second determination somewhat parallels Gentry. The court
held, also uncontroversially, that the Code does not preclude the
development of non-sales contract law. 9 It went on to find an im-
plied warranty which it described only obliquely but which can be
paraphrased as a warranty that the goods provided would not, at
the time they left the seller's control, be unreasonably dangerous
for their ordinary or foreseeable uses. 30
This part of the case is a bit puzzling. Clearly, the court meant
to impose some form of merchantability warranty although there
existed no Article Two contract. However, rather than creating a
merchantability warranty for services, it implied a warranty with
regard to the goods provided in conjunction with the services. Fur-
ther, that implied warranty was not identical to the goods
merchantability warranty of Article Two. Instead, it was phrased
in terms of "strict liability" under section 402A of the Second Re-
statement of Torts. 1
It would have perhaps made more sense to allocate the contract
between its goods and services portion and place the goods portion
under the Article Two warranty of merchantability standards.2
25. Id. at 309-312.
26. Id. at 309.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 310.
30. Id.
31. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
32. Another alternative existed as well. With regard to Velsicol, the court could have held
that, since the Velsicol-Paramount contract was obviously an Article Two contract, the Arti-
cle Two warranties applied to it (unless they were disclaimed by Velsicol, an issue not dis-
cussed by the court) and should be extended to Steingaszner through the anti-privity provi-
sion of VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (Add. Vol. 1965). See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying
text.
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Steingaszner in effect creates two different merchantability war-
ranties for goods: (1) the Code warranty applicable to contracts in
which the predominant purpose is the sale of goods; and (2) the
Restatement-based warranty applicable to contracts in which the
predominant purpose is the sale of other property or services.
There is no obvious reason for creating two different warranties.
Much of the court's confusion is attributable to the earlier Vir-
ginia Supreme Court case of Logan v. Montgomery Ward & Co.33
upon which Steingaszner relied. Logan was an entirely run-of-the-
mill Article Two case in which a defective gas stove exploded. 4 It
should have been analyzed under the merchantability provisions of
the Code. It was not. There is not a single reference in Logan ei-
ther to the Code or to the Code's standards of merchantability.
Rather than rely upon the statutory standards, the court, for no
perceptible reason, created its own standard, stating that:
Under either the warranty theory or the negligence theory the plain-
tiff must show, (1) that the goods were unreasonably dangerous ei-
ther for the use to which they would ordinarily be put or for some
other reasonably foreseeable purpose, and (2) that the unreasonably
dangerous condition existed when the goods left the defendant's
hands.3 5
This rule, which was copied almost verbatim in Steingaszner,36 se-
riously misstates the seller's merchantability obligations under Ar-
ticle Two.3
33. 216 Va. 425, 219 S.E.2d 685 (1975).
34. Id. at 426-27, 219 S.E.2d at 686.
35. Id. at 428, 219 S.E.2d at 687.
36. 5 Va. Cir. at 310.
37. Article Two's implied warranty of merchantability imposes significantly different obli-
gations on the seller than the Restatement-based warranty used in Logan and Steingaszner.
It states:
Goods to be merchantable must at least be such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description;
and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality
and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require;
and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if
any.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-314(2) (Add. Vol. 1965).
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The third determination made in Steingaszner also parallels
Gentry. The court held that the anti-privity provision of Article
Two38 applied, which permitted Steingaszner to sue Velsicol, even
though he had not dealt with Velsicol himself.39 It is difficult to
reconcile this with the court's decision that Article Two did not
apply to the contract.40 It would have been more appropriate to
hold, as did Gentry, that the common law no longer required priv-
ity in this type of action. Of course, such a determination would
have left the Steingaszner court, like the Gentry court, subject to
the criticism that it was articulating a change in common law
neither mandated by the General Assembly nor permitted by ex-
isting precedent. It would, however, have removed an unnecessary
internal contradiction.
B. Express Warranties
One of the chronic problems of contract law is that of deciding
the content of the contract. This is not just a matter of interpret-
ing the words of the contract. It is equally a matter of determining
what words are "in" the contract and what sources will be used to
define the words that are "in" the contract. For example, suppose
ABC Co. and XYZ, Inc. are negotiating a contract for sale of wom-
bats. During the course of the negotiation, various letters, forms,
telephone messages and telegrams are exchanged. The terms in the
documents do not precisely match. Terms of art are used in these
documents that have meanings in the wombat industry which dif-
fer from their "dictionary" meanings. Some terms are used that
are understood one way by ABC and quite a different way by XYZ.
A mass of words, creating a complex of understandings and expec-
tations, has been generated. Which words and what understand-
ings are legally part of the content of the parties' agreement?
It is a rough but fair generalization that "classical" contract law
(more precisely, the academic contract law of the late 19th and
early 20th centuries) severely restricted the sources of contract
terms in a perhaps foredoomed effort to ensure certainty and avoid
the imposition of unanticipated obligations. It is an equally accu-
rate generalization that modern contract law has significantly re-
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (Cur. Supp. 1987).
39. Steingaszner, 5 Va. Cir. at 311.
40. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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laxed prior limitations and invites more wide-ranging exploration
of the various indices of the parties' intentions and expectations.
In short, the goal of "classical" contract law was a document that
spelled out exactly what each party had to do, sometimes without
regard to whether that document accurately described what the
parties understood to be their duties. The goal of modern contract
law is the enforcement of the parties' expectations regarding the
deal, sometimes without regard to what they formally agreed. The
difference reflects, not an overthrow of prior law, but a shift in em-
phasis; it is not that contract documents have become unimportant
but that they are treated with slightly less reverence. Even today,
in transactions that involve sophisticated parties and require a
high degree of certainty, the courts tend to adhere strictly to the
traditional, narrow view of the scope of obligation.
The proper relationship between the parol evidence rule and ex-
press warranties is a major battleground in this eternal struggle
between certainty and expectation. The parol evidence rule41 seeks
certainty by limiting the search for contract terms to the parties'
last written version of their contract. The law regarding express
warranties42 protects expectation by including in the contract
"[a]ny affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the
buyer ... [any description of the goods [and] . .. [a]ny sample
or model [of the goods] . . .,.
In its attempt to reconcile these two provisions, the Code man-
ages only an uneasy and uncertain compromise. In theory, express
warranties cannot be unilaterally disclaimed by the seller.44 They
can, however, be eliminated from the contract by the operation of
the parol evidence rule if the express warranty is not included in
the written version of the contract and either the express warranty
is inconsistent with the written terms or the written terms are in-
tended to be "complete and exclusive". 45 The distinction between a
41. Codified in Article Two as VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-202 (Add. Vol. 1965).
42. Id. § 8.2-313.
43. Id.
44. The Code provides:
Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an expresi warranty and words or con-
duct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as
consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this [Article] on parol or
extrinsic evidence (§ 8.2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that
such construction is unreasonable.
Id. § 8.2-316(1).
45. Id. §§ 8.2-202(b), -316(1).
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mere disclaimer that doeg not affect parol express warranties, and
a complete integration that does, is, to put it mildly, an evanescent
one.
This was the issue tackled in Hoover Universal, Inc. v. Brock-
way Imco, Inc.46 Hoover Universal, Inc. ("Hoover") purchased a
plastic bottle manufacturing process (called the "ORB VI") from
Brockway Imco, Inc. ("Brockway"). One of the documents given by
Brockway to Hoover was a handout that unintentionally misstated
the number of bottles the machine would produce during each
",cycle.94 7
The signed version of the agreement was "a lengthy written con-
tract" that contained a disclaimer of all warranties other than
those specifically designated in the written document.48 There was
no mention in the document of the number of bottles the ORB VI
would produce per cycle.49 The document also contained the fol-
lowing integration clause:
This Agreement represents the entire understanding and agreement
between the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter here
and cannot be amended, supplemented or changed, nor can any pro-
vision hereof be waived, except by written instrument signed by the
party against whom enforcement of any such amendment, supple-
ment, modification or waiver is sought.5 0
The court held that the integration clause was sufficient to bar any
parol proof of the express warranty that allegedly was created by
the handout.5 1
The case, like many such cases, gives little rationale for its leap
from the integration clause to the conclusion that the parol evi-
dence rule applied. Section 8.2-202 only operates to bar parol evi-
dence if the writing is "intended by the parties as a final expres-
sion of their agreement .... "I" Even then, consistent additional
terms are permitted unless the parties intended a complete inte-
gration; i.e., unless they intended the writing to be "a complete
46. 809 F.2d 1039 (4th Cir. 1987).
47. Id. at 1041.
48. Id. at 1041-42.
49. Id. at 1042.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1043-44.
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-202 (Add. Vol. 1965).
1987] 703
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement." 3 More-
over, a course of dealing, usage of trade, or course of performance
can explain or supplement even a complete integration. 4
The intent requirement of the parol evidence rule is curiously
contradictory to one of the requirements for creation of an express
warranty. An express warranty comes into existence only if some
promise, affirmation, description, sample or model regarding the
goods became part of "the basis of the bargain. '55 Although the
exact scope of that requirement is somewhat uncertain, it is clear
that it requires at least some very general form of reliance. 6 By
definition, a buyer who is relying on a promise, expecting the goods
to conform to that promise, does not intend a document that ex-
cludes that promise to be a complete and exclusive expression of
agreement. The court should thus have focused on the relationship
between the basis of the bargain rule and the intent aspect of the
parol evidence rule.57 In other words, an integration clause should
bar parol evidence of an express warranty only if the buyer's agree-
ment to the integration clause manifested his or her decision not to
make the express warranty part of the basis of the bargain. More
concretely, an integration clause contained in a document prepared
by the buyer, or jointly by the buyer and the seller, should ordina-
rily bar such parol evidence because the reasonable interpretation
of the buyer's acquiescence in such a document is that prior state-
ments are not part of the basis of the bargain. An integration
clause buried in preprinted boilerplate that probably neither party
read should not ordinarily have the effect of barring parol evi-
dence, because it does not ordinarily evidence a willingness to
forego the warranty.
Even less explanation was given for the court's peremptory dis-
missal of Hoover's assertion that a usage of trade was applicable
and admissible. It merely stated that "[i]t is readily apparent that
Hoover intended to introduce trade usage not to explain or supple-
ment the meaning of a contract term, but rather to contradict the
limitation of warranties .... -58 This statement is in curious con-
53. Id. § 8.2-202(b).
54. Id. § 8.2-202(a).
55. Id. § 8.2-313(1).
56. See generally, J. WrT & R. SUMMERS, supra note 4, § 9-4, at 332-39.
57. One reason it may not have done so is procedural. By classifying the issue as parol
evidence rather than basis of the bargain, the court created an issue for the trial court judge
to decide rather than for the jury. Hoover Universal, 809 F.2d at 1042-43.
58. Id. at 1043.
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trast to the Fourth Circuit's earlier, and much more expansive,
view of the admissibility of trade usage in the teeth of the con-
tract's express terms and the parol evidence rule. 9
C. Statute of Limitations
Two relatively minor cases discuss aspects of the statute of limi-
tations applicable to Article Two contracts. In Roy Stone Transfer
Corp. v. Budd Co., 0 the Fourth Circuit noted that a party can be
estopped from raising the statute of limitations if it lulls the other
party "into inaction to its detriment by . ..assurances and at-
tempted repairs."'" However, since the plaintiff failed to produce
any evidence of the alleged lulling, the court upheld the district
court's determination that the defendant was not estopped. 2
In Stone v. Ethan Allen, Inc.,63 the Virginia Supreme Court ex-
amined the interrelationship of three different statutes of limita-
tions. The first was the general four-year statute of limitations ap-
plicable in Article Two transactions.6 4 The second was the five-year
statute of limitations for personal injury and property damage in
products liability actions.6 5 The third was the then-applicable five-
year property damage statute of limitations for negligence
actions. 6
The plaintiff had purchased a refrigerator, which was delivered
to their home on February 8, 1975. It allegedly caused a fire on
July 20, 1977. Suit was filed by the plaintiff on September 28,
1981.67
The court held that the five-year products liability statute of
59. Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971) (inclusion of price
in written contract with integration clause did not preclude parol evidence of trade usage
that no firm price was set by the parties).
60. 796 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1986).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 721-22.
63. 232 Va. 365, 350 S.E.2d 629 (1986).
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-725 (Add. Vol. 1965).
65. The provision states, in pertinent part:
Provided that as to any action to which § 8.2-725 of the Uniform Commercial Code is
applicable, that section shall be controlling except that in products liability actions
for injury to person and for injury to property, other than the property subject to
contract, the limitation prescribed in § 8.01-243 [five years] shall apply.
Id. § 8.01-246 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
66. Stone, 232 Va. at 368, 350 S.E.2d at 631.
67. Id. at 366, 350 S.E.2d at 630.
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limitations did not apply, because it did not go into effect until
October 1, 1977.68 Since the Article Two cause of action was in
warranty, it accrued on the date of tender of delivery-February 8,
1975.69 Thus, the warranty cause of action was not timely. 0 How-
ever, since the negligence cause of action did not accrue until the
injury occurred on July_20, 1977, and the applicable negligence
limitations period was five years, the negligence cause of action was
timely.71
D. Damages
Several cases made routine statements about Article Two dam-
ages. The first noted that, although absolute certainty is not re-
quired, there must be more than vague, indefinite and speculative
evidence of damages to create a jury question.7 2 The second case
reiterated the measure of damages for breach of warranty with re-
gard to accepted but non-conforming goods; the difference, mea-
sured at the time and place of acceptance, between the actual
value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if
they had been as warranted.3
The third case is rather more interesting. In Wharton, AIdhizer
& Weaver v. Savin Corp.,"4 the plaintiff purchased an allegedly de-
fective photocopier from the defendant. Since the goods were ac-
cepted by the buyer, the measure of damages for their non-con-
formity to the contract was that noted just above, the difference
between the value of the goods and the value they would have had
if they had been as warranted. The only evidence presented by the
plaintiff regarding the actual value of the photocopier was two
vague statements made by partners in the plaintiff firm: "'I guess
I could graphically describe it this way. If the defendants offered it
to us for fifty dollars, I would not want it. It has no value to our
firm.'" and " '[t]hat machine has absolutely no value to our firm or
to me individually.' "75The Virginia Supreme Court held that this
evidence was entitled to no weight whatsoever; thus, as a matter of
68. Id. at 368-69, 350 S.E.2d at 631.
69. Id. at 368-69, 350 S.E.2d at 631; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-725(2) (Add. Vol. 1965).
70. Stone, 232 Va. at 367, 350 S.E.2d at 630-31.
71. Id. at 369-70, 350 S.E.2d at 631-33.
72. Medcom, Inc. v. C. Arthur Weaver Co., 232 Va. 80, 87, 348 S.E.2d 243, 248 (1986).
73. Roy Stone Transfer Corp. v. Budd Co., 796 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1986); see VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.2-714(2) (Add. Vol. 1965).
74. 232 Va. 375, 350 S.E.2d 635 (1986).
75. Id. at 377, 350 S.E.2d at 636.
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law, the plaintiff had failed to prove damages.76 This case is signifi-
cant because it virtually requires a party attempting to prove the
value of accepted goods to either sell the goods or to present expert
testimony regarding their value.
III. COMMERCIAL PAPER
A. Negotiability
One of the central concepts in Commercial Paper law is of course
negotiability. Although virtually any document or obligation is
transferable, only a few types of documents are negotiable, mean-
ing that the document "embodies" rights extraneous to the docu-
ment itself (e.g., the right to payment of money). To be negotiable,
a writing must be in a particular form. With regard to drafts, such
as checks, and notes, the form is that set out in Article Three of
the Code." In general, Article Three requires the draft or note to
be complete within its four corners; that is, to include all the terms
necessary to express the obligation with no surplusage. Those bits
of paper that do not meet the requirements of Article Three are
not negotiable as that term is defined in Article Three and, with
one very limited exception, drafts and notes that are not in Article
Three negotiable form are not subject to the rules of Article
Three.7 8
Article Three negotiability is significant for a number of reasons.
One of the most important is that the transferee of a negotiable
instrument can become a "holder-in-due-course. 7 9 Unlike most
transferees, a holder-in-due-course can actually receive more than
the transferor had; that is, the holder-in-due-course takes free of
most defenses on, and all claims to, the instrument, even though
the holder-in-due-course's transferor may have been subject to
them.80
Needless to say, there have been many reported cases interpret-
ing virtually every one of the Article Three negotiability require-
76. Id. at 378, 350 S.E.2d at 637.
77. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.3-104 to -119 (Add. Vol. 1965).
78. The exception is that contained in § 8.3-805, which extends the rules of Article Three,
except for those regarding the rights of a holder-in-due-course, to instruments that are non-
negotiable solely because they are neither payable to order nor to bearer. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.3-805 (Add. Vol. 1965).
79. Id. § 8.3-302.
80. Id. § 8.3-305.
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ments. The Virginia Supreme Court added two more cases during
1986. Both cases were concerned with the requirement that, to be
negotiable, the draft or note contain an unconditional promise or
order to pay money s' and, more specifically, that the draft or note
not incorporate any extraneous agreement."2 A note or draft may,
on the other hand, refer to an extraneous document or
agreement.8 3
In Salomonsky v. Kelly, 4 the court reviewed promissory notes
that, by their terms, were "payable as set forth in that certain
agreement dated March 15, 1976, an executed copy of which is at-
tached hereto and made a part hereof by this reference.""5 The
court held that the notes were non-negotiable, because the quoted
statement incorporated, rather than merely referenced, the other
document:
The distinction is between a mere recital of the existence of the sep-
arate agreement or a reference to it for information . . . and any
language which, fairly construed, requires the holder to look to the
other agreement for the terms of payment. The intent of the provi-
sion is that an instrument is not negotiable unless the holder can
ascertain all of its essential terms from its face."
Since one essential term of a negotiable instrument is that it be
payable on demand or at a deffinite time," the holder of the notes
would have to look to the other document to determine exactly
what was held. This in turn meant that the notes were non-
negotiable.88
The case is not controversial. However, some caution should be
exercised in reading the statement that "an instrument is not ne-
gotiable unless the holder can ascertain all of its essential terms
from its face."8 9 There is nothing in the Code that prohibits the
use of both sides of a page, or indeed multiple pages, in a negotia-
ble instrument. What is prohibited is the incorporation of terms
81. Id. § 8.3-104(1)(b).
82. Id. § 8.3-105(2)(a).
83. Id. § 8.3-105(1)(b)-(e).
84. 232 Va. 261, 349 S.E.2d 358 (1986).
85. Id. at 263, 349 S.E.2d at 359 (emphasis omitted).
86. Id. at 264, 349 S.E.2d at 360 (emphasis omitted)(citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.3-105(c)
comment 8).
87. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.3-104(1)(c) (Add. Vol. 1965).
88. 232 Va. at 264, 349 S.E.2d at 360.
89. Id.
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from an independent document, even if that document is attached
to the note or draft9 0 This is a sensible rule if for no more esoteric
reason than that the attached document might at some point be-
come detached.
The second case, McLean Bank v. Nelson,91 provides a neat con-
trast to Salomonsky. In McLean Bank, a note was issued to the
order of L. Blaine Liljenquist. Below the signature lines on the
note appeared the following language:
This Note is hereby accepted this 20 day of June, 1974, pursuant to
Paragraph 4 of the Contract of Settlement dated the 10th day of
June, 1974, as to terms and amount.92
Liljenquist signed below this statement. 93
The statement appeared to be a mere acknowledgement of re-
ceipt; the court noted that it was not an "acceptance" in the Arti-
cle Three sense (that is, a promise by a drawee to honor a draft as
if it were a note).94 Thus, the language was surplusage with no legal
effect as regards the obligation expressed in the note itself.95 The
court went on to say that, even if the acceptance was a part of the
note, the statement "pursuant to Paragraph 4 of the Contract of
Settlement dated the 10th day of June, 1974, as to terms and
amount" was a mere reference, not an incorporation of an extrane-
ous document. 6
The court's decision is undoubtedly correct. Some question
should be raised, however, about the court's willingness to address
an issue that was in no way necessary to the resolution of the case.
Since the acceptance was irrelevant to the negotiability of the in-
strument, it was not necessary to determine whether the language
it used was an incorporation or a reference. Thus, although the
90. 5 R. ANDERSON, supra note 4, § 3-104:5.
91. 232 Va. 420, 350 S.E.2d 651 (1986).
92. Id. at 422-23, 350 S.E.2d at 654.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 423, 350 S.E.2d at 654.
95. Id. at 429, 350 S.E.2d at 658. The court did not discuss explicitly whether the surplus-
age might have violated the requirement that the instrument contain no "promise, order,
obligation or power" other than the promise to pay money and a few specifically permitted
additional provisions. Id.; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.3-104(1)(b), -112 (Add. Vol. 1965). This is not
a serious problem, because that limitation relates only to promises, orders, obligations or
powers given by the maker or drawer and the "acceptance" was made by the payee, not the
maker. 232 Va. at 430, 350 S.E.2d at 658.
96. McLean Bank, 232 Va. at 430-31, 350 S.E.2d at 658-59.
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court explicitly stated that it was deciding on the basis of the in-
corporation issue rather than the relevancy issue,9" it is difficult to
see the statement about incorporation as anything more than mere
dicta.
B. Holder-In-Due-Course
As noted above, one of the major functions of negotiability is to
permit certain transferees to be "holders-in-due-course." 8 A
holder-in-due-course is given special status by Articles Three and
Four. The most significant, but by no means the only benefit, is
that the holder-in-due-course takes free of so-called "personal" de-
fenses of any party to the instrument 9 This means, for example,
that a holder-in-due-course can recover on an instrument even
though the maker, drawer, or other party had a defense such as
failure of consideration, breach of warranty, or fraudulent
inducement.
There is one major limitation on this freedom from personal de-
fenses. The holder-in-due-course does not take free of defenses if
the holder-in-due-course "dealt with" the person who is asserting
the defense. 100 The basic idea is that only a person who takes the
instrument without participation in the underlying transaction
should be able to escape defenses rooted in that transaction.
Village Motors, Inc. v. American Federal Savings and Loan As-
sociation'01 explores the significance of the "dealt with" limitation.
Village Motors, Inc. ("Village Motors") agreed to sell a car to Der-
onda Burnette ("Burnette") but required her to pay in cash or by
a "bank check." American Federal Savings and Loan Association
("American Federal"), Burnette's bank, issued a check for the
purchase price. It withdrew the amount from Burnette's account
but drew the check in its own name. The drawee was United Vir-
ginia Bank; the payee was Village Motors. 10 2
Burnette was dissatisfied with the car. She returned it to Village
Motors and asked American Federal to stop payment on the check.
American Federal directed United Virginia Bank to stop payment,
97. Id. at 430, 350 S.E.2d at 658.
98. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
99. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.3-305(2) (Add. Vol. 1965).
100. Id.
101. 231 Va. 408, 345 S.E.2d 288 (1986).
102. Id. at 410, 345 S.E.2d at 289.
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which it did. Village Motors sued American Federal and
Burnette. 10
3
Village Motors claimed that it was a holder-in-due-course and,
as such, took free of any personal defenses American Federal
might have.1 04 It correctly noted that a payee can be a holder-in-
due-course,10 5 provided that the holder meets the basic statutory
requirements, which are taking the instrument "for value," "in
good faith," and "without notice" of claims or defenses. 0 Appar-
ently Village Motors had no notice of the problems with the car at
the time it took the check; in any event, both sides agreed that
Village Motors was a holder-in-due-course. 0 7 The critical question
was thus whether Village Motors had "dealt with" American
Federal.
The Code is remarkably unhelpful on this point. The Official
Comments specifically describe the Village Motors type of transac-
tion as one in which a payee can be a holder-in-due-course. s08
However, neither the comments nor the Code state whether such a
payee takes free of the drawer's personal defenses. A smattering of
pre-Code caselaw said that the payee did take free; 09 at least two
Code commentaries assume, without analysis, that the result would
remain the same. 10 Based on those commentaries, the court ruled
that Village Motors took free of American Federal's personal
defenses."'
What is missing from those commentaries is a rationale. Why
should the payee take free of the defenses? Obviously, if Burnette
had issued the check to Village Motors, it would have taken sub-
ject to her defenses. Why should the use of American Federal as a
conduit change things?
One possible rationale is that American Federal was performing
103. Id. at 411, 345 S.E.2d at 289.
104. Id. at 411, 345 S.E.2d at 290.
105. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.3-302(2) (Add. Vol. 1965).
106. Id. § 8.3-302(1).
107. Village Motors, 231 Va. at 411, 345 S.E.2d at 290.
108. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.3-302 comment 2(a); see Village Motors, 231 Va. at 412, 345
S.E.2d at 290.
109. See, e.g., Boston Steel & Iron Co. v. Steuer, 183 Mass. 140, 66 N.E. 646 (1903); see
also Poirier v. Morris, 118 Eng. Rep. 702 (Q.B. 1853).
110. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 4, § 14-7, at 568; Note, The Concept of Holder
in Due Course in Article III of the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1573,
1582 (1983).
111. Village Motors, 231 Va. at 413, 345 S.E.2d at 291.
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a service comparable to that performed by the issuer of a letter of
credit.11 2 The whole purpose of obtaining either a letter of credit or
a "bank check" rather than a personal check is to ensure payment.
The most obvious payment risk eliminated by use of a bank check
is the risk that the check will be dishonored for lack of sufficient
funds in the drawer's account. Village Motors permits payees to
avoid another payment risk, customer dissatisfaction. The risk
avoidance is narrow since the payee must qualify as a holder-in-
due-course which, among other things, means that the payee must
not have had notice of the customer's dissatisfaction when it took
the instrument."' Thus, if Village Motors had notice that the car
was a clunker, it would not have taken free of American Federal's
defense.
This is all very well. However, the suggested theory does not ad-
equately justify the imposition of the countervailing obligation on
a perhaps unsophisticated consumer. No sound reason was ad-
vanced by the court or is perceived by this author for stripping the
consumer of his or her ability to stop payment if the goods pur-
chased prove unsatisfactory. It is a fair guess that most consumer
buyers anticipate, as a part of their bargain, the right to stop pay-
ment on a check given for a lemon. There is no overwhelming rea-
son why this expectation should not be honored. Thus, while the
Village Motors rule is a sensible one in context of a commercial
transaction, it should not have been applied to the facts of the Vil-
lage Motors case.
C. Discharge
Two routine cases explored the provisions of Article Three relat-
ing to discharge of a party's obligation. The first of these, Gullette
v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.14 involved a note that was
stamped "paid by renewal." The Article Three issue was whether
the stamped language cancelled the note and thus discharged obli-
gors on the note." 5 The relevant Code provision states:
112. See infra notes 132-161 and accompanying text.
113. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.3-302(1)(c) (Add. Vol. 1965). It should also be noted that Virginia
has a very restrictive view as to what constitutes notice: "In any event, to constitute notice
of a claim or defense, the purchaser must have knowledge of the claim or defense or knowl-
edge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounts to bad faith." Id.
§ 8.3-304(7).
114. 231 Va. 486, 344 S.E.2d 920 (1986).
115. Id. at 490-91, 344 S.E.2d at 923.
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The holder of an instrument may even without consideration dis-
charge any party
(a) in any manner apparent on the face of the instrument or
the indorsement, as by intentionally cancelling the instrument
or the party's signature by destruction or mutilation, or by
striking out the party's signature . ... 6
The court held that the "paid by renewal" language was not suffi-
cient to evidence an intentional cancellation, but was rather an ac-
knowledgement of the conditional payment of the debt by the issu-
ance of a new note.11
The second case illustrated an extremely basic, but extremely
important, principle of commercial paper law. In Lambert v.
Barker,"' William and Barbara Barker ("Barkers") issued a note
to Robert Davis ("Davis"). Davis indorsed and transferred the note
to Katherine W. Lambert, trustee for Cecil-Waller & Sterling, Inc.
("Lambert"). Davis subsequently signed a fraudulent affidavit in
which he stated that the note had been lost. In reliance on that
affidavit, the amount owing on the note was paid to Davis.11 9 The
court correctly held that this payment did not discharge the
Barkers. 120
The reason is simple. The negotiable instrument "embodies" the
right to be paid. Thus, payment of a negotiable instrument can
only constitute a discharge if it is made to a holder. 2' To be a
holder, one must be in possession of the instrument. 122 Davis was
not in possession of the instrument at the time of the payment and
thus was not a holder. 12 3 To protect themselves, payors can (and
should) demand production of the instrument and refuse payment
until the instrument is produced or the payors are properly indem-
nified against the risk that the instrument still exists and has come
into the possession of another holder. 124
116. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.3-605(I)(a) (Add. Vol. 1965).
117. Gullette, 231 Va. at 491, 344 S.E.2d at 923.
118. 232 Va. 21, 348 S.E.2d 214 (1986).
119. Id. at 22-23, 348 S.E.2d at 214-15.
120. Id. at 26-27, 348 S.E.2d at 216-17.
121. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.3-603 (Add. Vol. 1965).
122. Id. §§ 8.1-201(20), 8.3-202(1).
123. Lambert, 232 Va. at 26, 348 S.E.2d at 216-17.
124. Id. at 24, 348 S.E.2d at 215; VAL CODE ANN. §§ 8.3-505(1), -804.
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D. Statute of Limitations
The final case in this section of the Commercial Law Survey,
Harris & Harris v. Tabler,125 merely reiterated a well-established
principle regarding the statute of limitations. 126 The cause of ac-
tion against the maker of a demand note accrues the date of the
note or, if the note is undated, on the date the note was issued. 2 '
Thus, Virginia's five-year limitations period s2 runs from the date
of the note or its issuance. 129
IV. BANK COLLECTION
The General Assembly made one minor change to Article Four.
It amended section 8.4-106 to state that "A branch or separate of-
fice of a bank is a separate bank for the purpose of computing the
time within which and determining the place at or to which action
may be taken or notices or orders shall be given . . . ."13 Prior to
this amendment, only branches that maintained their own deposit
ledgers were treated as separate banks.' 13 This change will slightly
increase the permissible time for some transactions by some banks.
V. LETTERS OF CREDIT
Article Five, which governs letters of credit, is one of the most
obscure parts of the Code. It engenders relatively little reported
litigation, and tends to be the province of comparatively few law-
yers. In part, this is because there is so little "law" involved in
letters of credit. Both Article Five and the parallel Uniform Cus-
toms and Practice for Documentary Credits ("UCP") provide only
a very brief sketch of the parties' rights and obligations. By and
large, those obligations are determined by the letter of credit it-
self. 32 However, there are some significant legal issues, and a re-
125. 232 Va. 75, 348 S.E.2d 241 (1986).
126. See also Herbert, Commercial Law: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 20 U. RICH. L.
REv. 745, 755-58 (1986).
127. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.3-122(1)(b).
128. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-246(2) (Repl. Vol. 1984).
129. Tabler, 232 Va. at 79, 348 S.E.2d at 243.
130. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.4-106 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
131. Id. § 8.4-106 (Add. Vol. 1965).
132. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 4, § 18-3, at 715-21; see also VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.5-102(3) which states:
This title deals with some but not all of the rules and concepts of letters of credit as
such rules or concepts have developed prior to this act or may hereafter develop. The
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cent Virginia circuit court opinion from Alexandria, United Vir-
ginia Bank v. Bank of Alexandria,133 provides a good primer on
them.
Put simply, a letter of credit is an arrangement under which an
"issuer" agrees to pay money to a "beneficiary" on behalf of a
"customer" if and when the beneficiary meets the conditions set
out in the letter of credit.134 For example, Seller Co. might be the
beneficiary of a letter of credit issued by Sixth National Bank for
Sixth National's customer, Buyer, Inc. When and if Seller Co.
presents Sixth National with a sight draft and a bill of lading cov-
ering the goods Seller Co. is shipping to Buyer, Inc., Sixth National
will pay Seller Co. the amount of the sight draft (which of course is
ordinarily the amount of the purchase price for the goods).
In United Virginia Bank, United Virginia Bank ("UVB") was
the beneficiary of a letter of credit issued by The Bank of Alexan-
dria ("Alexandria") to C. Michael Simpson ("Simpson"). The let-
ter of credit was used not to pay for goods, but as a security device
to ensure payment of certain loans. 13 5 The letter of credit was in
the amount of $39,900.136 It imposed, as a condition of payment, a
requirement that UVB present several documents: a sight draft,
the letter of credit, the promissory note it secured, and a demand
letter. 37 Demand had to be made prior to December 31, 1984.138
There was a mistake in the letter of credit. At the bottom of the
first page was an incomplete sentence fragment which began, "[a]ll
drafts must be . ... ,,13 The parties agreed that the sentence, if
completed, would have said, "[a]ll drafts must be marked 'Drawn
under the Bank of Alexandria, LC #83-120, which expires Decem-
ber 31, 1984.' ,114o They disagreed as to whether or not the parties
had agreed to the inclusion of this additional term in the letter of
credit.' 4 '
fact that this title states a rule does not by itself require, imply or negate application
of the same or a converse rule to a situation not provided for or to a person not
specified by this title.
133. 8 Va. Cir. 178 (Alexandria 1986).
134. See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 4, § 18-2, at 711-15.
135. 8 Va. Cir. at 178.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 179.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 182.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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Sometime after the issuance of the original letter of credit,
Simpson had Alexandria replace it with two $19,950 letters of
credit.14 On December 6, 1985, UVB made demand under the orig-
inal letter of credit, which Alexandria refused. 143 Alexandria as-
serted that the $19,950 letters of credit replaced the $39,900 letter
of credit and that the $39,900 letter of credit was invalid because
of the error.1 44 UVB then demanded payment under the two
$19,950 letters of credit which was refused by Alexandria on the
ground that UVB failed to present the necessary documentation. 45
The court examined three major issues. First, was the original
letter of credit supplanted by the subsequent letters of credit? Sec-
ond, did UVB make effective demand on the letter of credit?
Third, was UVB bound by the requirement that would have been
contained in the incomplete sentence?
The first issue is the simplest. The credit was an "irrevocable"
one, and once the beneficiary received an irrevocable letter of
credit or an authorized written advice of its issuance, the credit
could not be modified or revoked without the beneficiary's con-
sent.4 6 The reason is obvious: the letter of credit serves as a device
to ensure payment of an obligation, and would be poor insurance
indeed if the issuer and customer could freely change its terms or
cancel it.
The second issue is also a fairly simple one. In essence, it is the
degree of compliance with the terms of the letter of credit required
for the beneficiary to receive payment. Must the beneficiary do ex-
actly as the letter of credit demands, or is substantial compliance
sufficient?
The problem is significant because of the nature of the letter of
credit. The letter is a device designed to ensure an entirely sepa-
rate transaction in which the issuer is in no way involved. 47 The
issuer thus has little information about the transaction and little
opportunity to determine whether both parties are satisfied.
In consequence, a rule of strict compliance has evolved and been
142. Id. at 179.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 180; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.5-106(2) (Add. Vol. 1965); U.C.P., Form and Nota-
tion of Credits Art. 3(c) (1974).
147. See United Va. Bank, 8 Va. Cir. at 181.
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almost universally accepted. 48 The beneficiary must do exactly
what is required by the letter of credit. This in turn obligates the
issuer to honor the letter of credit. This strict rule (a/k/a the "New
York Rule") was adopted by United Virginia Bank.4 '
The third issue, which is related to the second, was the most
difficult. UVB had complied with all the purported requirements
for payment except, apparently, the requirement that would have
been stated in the incomplete sentence. The drafts apparently did
not include a specific reference to the letter of credit. If that re-
quirement was part of the letter of credit, UVB was not entitled to
payment.15
0
The court held that the letter of credit was subject to the com-
mon-law parol evidence rule.' 5 ' Thus, extrinsic evidence of addi-
tional obligations could not be admitted unless the writing were
incomplete or ambiguous.152 The court defined "complete" as
meaning that the writing contained all of the material terms; in
context of a letter of credit, it further refined "material terms" to
mean all of the elements needed for enforceability. 53 Since even
without the incomplete sentence the letter of credit contained all
the terms necessary for it to be enforced, the letter of credit was
not an incomplete writing.154
The court also rejected the assertion that the incomplete sen-
tence created an ambiguity. It defined ambiguity narrowly, to
mean a term that" 'admit[s] of two or more meanings [or] of being
understood in more than one way, or of referring of [sic] two or
more things at the same time.' ",'55 Since the provision in question
was critically incomplete, the court held that it was "mere surplus-
148. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 4, § 18-6, at 731-32.
149. 8 Va. Cir. at 181.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 182. The court based this holding on the Code which states:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this act, the principles of law and
equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, prin-
cipal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bank-
ruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.1-103 (Add. Vol. 1965). Nothing in Article Five explicitly deals with parol
evidence.
152. United Va. Bank, 8 Va. Cir. at 182.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 183. The court further noted that the specific subject matter of the incomplete
sentence (the terms of presentment) was dealt with elsewhere in the document, which fur-
ther suggested that the document was not incomplete. Id. at 182.
155. Id. at 183 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1976)).
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age susceptible of no interpretation. It means absolutely
nothing."' 56
This extremely restrictive view of the parol evidence rule was
justified by the court as a corollary of the strict compliance rule
noted above.157 In other words, just as the beneficiary is obligated
to comply strictly with the exact and explicit requirements of the
letter of credit, the issuer is obligated to make the conditions it
wishes to impose definite and clear. 158 These paired requirements
of precision and strict compliance were viewed by the court as cen-
tral to the notion that the letter of credit is entirely independent of
the obligation it facilitates. 5 ' In any event, the court found the
approach appropriate in light of the fact that Alexandria had
drafted the letter of credit: "In essence, [Alexandria] urges this
Court to read a condition into the credit which is not literally there
and thereby permit [Alexandria] to profit from its own sloppy
drafting and proofreading."' 60
In light of the nature of letters of credit, which are instruments
used exclusively (or almost exclusively) by reasonably sophisti-
cated businesses advised (one hopes) by reasonably sophisticated
lawyers, the rigid structure adopted by the court is a thoroughly
sensible one, even though its stated rationale is a bit debatable.' 6 '
The whole purpose of the letter of credit is to provide maximum
predictability at minimum cost. The simplest and most efficient
way to accomplish this twin goal is to do what the court in United
Virginia Bank did-limit the obligations of the beneficiary to
those explicitly set out in the document that the parties designated
as their contract and require perfect adherence by the beneficiary
to those stated obligations.
156. Id.
157. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
158. United Va. Bank, 8 Va. Cir. at 183.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 184.
161. It is a bit difficult to see why the letter of credit cannot survive as an independent
obligation even though its terms may require interpretation or permit substantial compli-
ance. The independence of the letter of credit depends upon its separation from the under-
lying transaction, not upon any special rules regarding interpretation of the letter of credit
itself.
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VI. BULK SALES
Article Six of the Code, which governs bulk sales, is even more of
an orphan than Article Five. It is designed to protect creditors of a
business that primarily sells from inventory when that business
sells its assets to a third party. It does so by giving those creditors
notice of the sale."6 2 However, in most states (including Virginia),
Article Six gives no special substantive rights to the creditors to
block or undo the transaction if the required notice is given. Thus,
there is considerable doubt that it provides any effective protection
to creditors.' In any event, the Article has engendered very little
reported litigation.
One issue that has cropped up with fair frequency is the applica-
bility of Article Six. This breaks into two subdivisions: (1) the na-
ture of the business; and (2) the nature of the transfer. Only busi-
nesses whose primary business is sale from inventory are
covered." 4 Even if the business is covered, the transaction is cov-
ered only if it is a "transfer in bulk and not in the ordinary course
of the transferor's business of a major part of the materials, sup-
plies, merchandise or other inventory . .. ."15
Thus, one interpretive issue is whether a "major part" of inven-
tory can be less than half of the inventory. A ten-year-old, but just
reported, Virginia circuit court opinion adopts the majority rule
that "major part" means more than half of the inventory. 6 The
court further noted that this is a change in pre-Code Virginia law,
under which the bulk transfer requirements applied, if "any part"
of the inventory was sold out of the ordinary course of business. 67
VII. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
A. Formal Requisites of a Security Agreement
One of the purposes of Article Nine was to simplify the formali-
ties involved in obtaining a security interest in personal property.
Generally, the security interest is created-"attaches"-when
162. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 4, § 19-1, at 754-58.
163. Id. at 767.
164. VA. CoDE ANN. § 8.6-102(3) (Add. Vol. 1965).
165. Id. § 8.6-102(1). Further, some such transfers are excluded. Id. § 8.6-103.
166. Atlantic Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Sol Laderberg Furniture, Inc., 6 Va. Cir. 518 (Norfolk
1977).
167. Id. at 519-20.
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three events occur: (1) the debtor executes a written security
agreement; (2) the debtor has or obtains rights in the collateral;
and (3) the secured party gives value. 6 " The agreement can be ex-
traordinarily simple. It only need contain "a description of the col-
lateral and in addition, when the security interest covers crops
growing or to be grown or timber to be cut, a description of the
land concerned .. ". ."I"' Despite the simplicity of these require-
ments, careless drafting has led to a wealth of dases examining just
how informal a security agreement can be. 17 0
In Whitmore & Arnold, Inc. v. Lucquet,27 1 France and Bruno
Lucquet ("Lucquets") executed two notes in favor of Farmers &
Merchants National Bank of Hamilton ("bank"). The proceeds of
the loans evidenced by the notes were used to purchase fertilizer
and other goods from Whitmore & Arnold, Inc. ("Whitmore").
Both notes were endorsed by Whitmore. Both notes contained se-
curity agreements, one in a soybean crop, the other in a corn crop.
In addition, each security agreement contained the following state-
ment: "The collateral subject to this agreement is more particu-
larly described on the front of this note, but may also be described
and supplemented by other security agreements or financing
statements executed by the Makers and/or Endorsers of this
note." '
7
Shortly after the two notes were executed, the Lucquets signed,
and Whitmore filed, a financing statement. The financing state-
ment named Whitmore as "secured party" and "assignee of se-
cured party." It covered certain farm equipment and a wheat
crop.17 3 Some time later, the Lucquets defaulted on the notes.
Whitmore paid the balance due to the bank, at which time the
bank assigned the notes and security agreements to Whitmore.
Whitmore then sought to seize the equipment and wheat crop.174
The question was a simple one: did the security interest attach
to the equipment and the wheat crop, or only to the corn and soy-
bean crops? The court noted that, ordinarily, two documents are
used in a secured transaction-the security agreement document,
168. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-203 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
169. Id. § 8.9-203(a).
170. See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 4, § 23-3, at 902-14.
171. 233 Va. 106, 353 S.E.2d 764 (1987).
172. Id. at 108, 353 S.E.2d at 765 (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 108, 353 S.E.2d at 765-66.
174. Id. at 108, 353 S.E.2d 766.
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which satisfies the filing of which is one of the requisites for at-
tachment, and the financing statement, the most common method
of perfection. 17 5 Attachment gives the secured party rights against
the debtor;17 6 perfection protects those rights against most subse-
quent third-party claims. 1 7 Since the two documents serve differ-
ent functions, the courts have held that a financing statement,
standing alone, is not a security agreement and thus cannot create
a security interest. 78 The more complex problem has been whether
a financing statement, in conjunction with other documents evi-
dencing agreement, can be sufficient to satisfy the Code's require-
ment of a written security agreement. The courts are split on this
issue.17 9
Whitmore & Arnold, Inc. at least partially adopts the better-rea-
soned view that, in appropriate circumstances, a financing state-
ment can provide part of the necessary contents of the security
agreement. 80 Specifically, the court held that the statement in the
security agreements permitting the addition of collateral in the fi-
nancing statement was enforceable, especially in light of the fact
that the Lucquets signed the financing statement as well.' Thus,
Whitmore had a security interest in the equipment and the wheat
crop. 82
B. Sale of Farm Products
Last year, the General Assembly, responding to the federal Food
Security Act of 1985,183 abolished the former "farm products ex-
ception" that left a purchaser of farm products from one engaged
in farming operations subject to certain security interests in those
farm products.8 This abolition meant that such purchasers would
now take free of those security interests. To prevent naughtiness
175. Id.
176. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-201 (Add. Vol. 1965).
177. Id. § 8.9-301.
178. R. ANDERSON, supra note 4, § 9-203:25, at 680.
179. Compare In re Bollinger Corp., 614 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1980) with American Card Co.
v. H.M.H. Co., 97 R.I. 59, 196 A.2d 150 (1963).
180. The court left open the question of whether the requirements could be met by a
group of documents, none of which were formally designated a security agreement. Whit-
more & Arnold, Inc., 233 Va. at 110 n.4, 353 S.E.2d at 767 n.4.
181. Id. at 110, 353 S.E.2d at 767.
182. Id.
183. 7 U.S.C. § 1631 (Supp. 1985).
184. See generally Herbert, supra note 126, at 758-60.
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by farmer-debtors, the General Assembly also strengthened a law
which made the fraudulent conversion of farm product collateral
larcenous. 5' In 1987, the General Assembly returned to this prob-
lem and, as a result, inserted into Article Nine of the Code a few
bits of criminal law and criminal procedure. It also has enacted a
law that is, in at least several respects, probably unconstitutional,
because it conflicts with the Food Security Act and thus violates
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.8 6
Nine new and original subsections were added to the statutory
provision providing protection for buyers in ordinary course of
business."s7 They are designed to punish farmers who improperly
sell farm product collateral, and to reinstate partially the farm
product exception. In essence, these provisions limit (1) the per-
sons to whom the seller can sell farm products and (2) the condi-
tions under which a buyer can buy the farm products free and
clear of the secured party's security interest in them.
Four parties are identified: the secured party;188 "a debtor en-
gaged in farming operations who gives a security interest in farm
products ..."s [hereinafter "a farmer" or "the farmer"]; a buyer
in ordinary course of business (a/k/a "a person buying farm prod-
ucts" [hereinafter the "buyer"]); and "a commission merchant or
selling agent."' 190 If the commission merchant or selling agent "sells
farm products in the ordinary course of business for a person en-
gaged in farming operations"' 91 he or she is treated as a buyer for
most, but not all, purposes. 92
Upon request of the secured party, the farmer must provide the
185. Id. at 759 & n.71.
186. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
187. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-307(4)-(12) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
188. Presumably the secured party to whom the farmer has granted the security interest,
although the provisions do not explicitly so state.
189. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-307(5) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
190. These terms are not defined in the Virginia Code, but are defined in the Food Secur-
ity Act as follows: "The term 'commission merchant' means any person engaged in the busi-
ness of receiving any farm product for sale, on commission, or for or on behalf of another
person." 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(3) (Supp. 1985). "The term 'selling agent' means any person,
other than a commission merchant, who is engaged in the business of negotiating the sale
and purchase of any farm product on behalf of a person engaged in farming operations." Id.
§ 1631(c)(8).
191. It is not clear whether the person selling farm products referred to in this defini-
tional subsection needs to be the farmer who has granted the security interest in the goods
at issue.
192. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-307(11) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
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secured party a written list identifying potential buyers and
"points of delivery" of "the farm products." '193 Presumably the
farm products means the farm products subject to the security in-
terest of the secured party. "If a potential buyer has more than one
point of delivery, each additional point of delivery [counts] as a
potential buyer" and must be included in the list. 94 The Food Se-
curity Act permits the secured party to require a similar list from
the debtor; however, the Food Security Act provision does not re-
quire the debtor to list points of delivery.195 Since the Virginia law
adds only a minor, non-conflicting requirement to the Food Secur-
ity Act, it may be permissible. 96 However, the Food Security Act
states that the security agreement must include the buyer list re-
quirement;1 97 Virginia's law permits the secured party to impose
this requirement on the farmer at any time,'98 which probably con-
flicts unconstitutionally with the parallel provision of the federal
law.
Once the farmer has provided the buyer list to the secured party,
the farmer cannot sell farm product collateral to any buyer who is
not on the list without the prior written consent of the secured
party."'99 This too is probably unconstitutional. The Food Security
Act permits the farmer to make sales to unlisted buyers if the
farmer either notifies the secured party of the unlisted buyer in
writing at least seven days prior to the sale or accounts to the se-
cured party for the proceeds of the sale within ten days after the
sale is made.200
The constitutionality of the Virginia buyer list requirements is
likely to be challenged, because violation of those requirements by
the farmer is a Class 1 misdemeanor.20' If the secured debt is paid
193. Id. § 8.9-307(5).
194. Id. This provision is redundant, since the farmer is already required by the preced-
ing sentence in the subsection to include all points of delivery in the list.
195. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(h)(1) (Supp. 1987).
196. Of course, even a non-conflicting state law may be unconstitutional under the
Supremacy Clause if regulation of the entire matter at issue is preempted by federal law.
The problem of implied preemption of non-conflicting state laws is a complex one, far be-
yond the scope of this article. For a short primer on the subject, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA
& J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 9.1-9.4 (3d ed. 1986).
197. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(h)(1).
198. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-307(5) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
199. Id. § 8.9-307(6).
200. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(h)(2).
201. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-307(6) (Cum. Supp. 1987). Of course, the author hopes that due
attention will be paid to the questions raised by this article and no such prosecutions will be
attempted until the constitutional problems are resolved.
1987] 723
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
or the proceeds of sale are applied to the debt prior to the com-
mencement of prosecution, however, the farmer has an absolute
defense to the charge. 2 Upon conviction, the court may grant pro-
bation, but only if it imposes restitution as a condition. 0 3
The secured party may notify anyone on the buyer list of its se-
curity interest, and may also notify other potential buyers if either
the farmer so consents, the farmer fails to provide the list, or the
secured party has reasonable cause to believe the debtor is about
to sell farm product collateral to the person to whom the notice is
sent. °4 Unless the buyer and the secured party otherwise agree,
the notice sent to the buyers must either comply with the provi-
sions of the Food Security Act, be a valid financing statement,0 5 or
be a statement that contains the full name and address of the
debtor and secured party,206 a description of the collateral, the
date and location of the filing of the financing statement, and "the
date and signature [sic] of the secured party. '207
If the debt secured by the security interest is paid and the
farmer so requests, the secured party must notify each of the buy-
ers that the debt has been satisfied.208 This notification must be
given within twenty-one days of the farmer's request.20 9 The notice
termination provision does not state whether the twenty-one day
period begins with the sending of the request by the farmer or its
receipt by the secured party; presumably the latter.
The notice provision also violates the Food Security Act. Under
the Act, additional information is required in the notice. For exam-
ple, to be valid, the Food Security Act notice must include the so-
cial security number or taxpayer identification number of the
farmers21 and a description of the property.211 The Food Security
202. Id.
203. Id. The provision does not state whether restitution must be of the entire debt, the
proceeds received, or some lesser amount.
204. Id. § 8.9-307(7).
205. Technically, "an original financing statement or a carbon, photographic or other re-
production of an original that is effective under § 8.9-402." Id.
206. The "full name and address" is not defined. For example, it is unclear whether mid-
dle names must be spelled out.
207. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-307(7) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
208. Id. § 8.9-307(8).
209. Id.
210. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(e)(1)(A)(ii)(III). See also the parallel provision dealing with commis-
sion merchants and selling agents (they are not lumped together with buyers by the Food
Security Act, although they are by the Virginia law). Id. § 1631(g)(2)(A)(ii)(III).
211. Id. § 1631(e)(1)(A)(ii)(IV); see also id. § 1631(g)(2)(A)(ii)(IV).
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Act notice apparently must also include a description of any condi-
tions imposed by the secured party for waiver or release of the se-
curity interest.212 Nothing in the Food Security Act permits the
substitute forms of notice permitted under Virginia law.
The purpose of the notice is to limit the ability of buyers to take
free of the security interest. Under Virginia law, any buyer who
receives the notice is required to make payment by check or other
instrument which must be payable jointly to the farmer and the
secured party.213 There is one exception to this. If the farmer
agrees in writing, the buyer may make payment directly to the se-
cured party.214 If the buyer fails to meet the joint check require-
ment, the buyer takes subject to the security interest. 15
Again, this is probably invalid. The Food Security Act notice will
also subject the buyer to the security interest, but the notice is
effective against the buyer for only one year.216 Moreover, the Food
Security Act notice does not impose the joint check requirement
on the buyer. Since, however, the joint check requirement at least
does not contradict the Food Security Act, it may be
permissible.21
Finally, the Virginia law imposes one restriction on most buyers
(but not commission merchants or selling agents) that has no par-
allel in the Food Security Act. If the buyer withholds from the
212. Read literally, the relevant provision provides:
A buyer of farm products takes subject to the security interest created by the seller if
. . . within 1 year before the sale of the farm products, the buyer has received from
the secured party or the seller written notice of the security interest organized ac-
cording to farm products that. . . any payment obligations imposed on the buyer by
the secured party as conditions for waiver or release of the security interest ....
Id. § 1631(e)(1)(A)(v). This is gibberish of a level remarkable even in Washington. The pro-
vision should probably have been numbered § 1631(e)(1)(A)(ii)(V), which would have read:
A buyer of farm products takes subject to the security interest created by the seller if
. . . within 1 year before the sale of the farm products, the buyer has received from
the secured party or the seller written notice of the security interest organized ac-
cording to farm products that. . . contains. . . any payment obligations imposed on
the buyer by the secured party as conditions for waiver or release of the security
interest ....
Id., see also id. § 1631(g)(2)(A)(v).
213. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-307(10) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(e)(1)(A); see also id. § 1631(g)(2)(A).
217. In any event, the Food Security Act apparently would permit the secured party to
impose this as a requirement for sale in the security agreement, and apparently would make
the condition binding on the buyer if it were disclosed in the notice given to the buyer by
the secured party. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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farmer all or part of the proceeds of the sale to satisfy a debt owed
by the farmer to the buyer, the buyer generally takes subject to the
security interest. This limitation does not apply if the debt was
secured by a perfected security interest that had priority over that
of the secured party; nor does it apply if the debt was for the cost
of harvesting, processing, storing, or marketing the farm products,
or transporting them to market.21 8 Whether this provision passes
muster or not depends upon the breadth of the Food Security
Act's preemption of the field.
Even if the constitutional problems did not exist, the General
Assembly should be faulted for inserting the non-commercial farm
product provisions in the Code. The Code of Virginia already suf-
fers severely from a lack of organization and coordination, espe-
cially with regard to procedural matters. The insertion by the Gen-
eral Assembly of both criminal procedure and substantive criminal
law into so unlikely a place as the Virginia's Uniform Commercial
Code reflects a lack of due concern for the ability of Virginians (or
at least Virginia lawyers and judges) to find Virginia law. If and
when the General Assembly returns to the farm product problem,
it should more carefully place the commercial, criminal, and proce-
dural provisions of its farm product law into the appropriate Titles
of the Virginia Code.
218. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-307(12) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
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